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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0133

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 17 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE 130TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HELD ON MARCH 17 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF NETHERLANDS REP (DE VOS), SOVIET REP (TARASOV DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN A STIFFLY WORDED COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION, TARASOV ATTACKED MAIN ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION POINT-BY-POINT. SOVIET REP ALSO STATED THAT TABLED EASTERN FIGURES DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FORCE LEVELS IN THE AREA WAS UNFOUNDED. SINCE THIS CONCEPT WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THE WEST'S PRESENT POSITION, IT FOLLOWED THAT THAT POSITION MUST BE CHANGED. TARASOV CONCLUDED BY CALLING FOR AGREEMENT ON THE EAST'S INTERIM FREEZE PROPOSAL. IN SO DOING, SOVIET REP STRESSED THAT THE WEST'S STANDARD ARGUMENTS AGAINST A FREEZE--LACK OF DATA AND CONTRACTUALIZATION OF EXISTING MANPOWER DISPARITY--HAVE NOW BEEN

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SHOWN TO BE INVALID. IN THE ENSUING POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH HAD UNUSUALLY LARGE ATTENDANCE BY EASTERN JOURNALISTS AND MEMBERS OF WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS, SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN AIDED BY COOPERATIVE PACT JOURNALISTS PLACED GREATEST STRESS ON POINT THAT NOW THAT WEST'S DISPARITY THESIS HAD BEEN VOIDED BY EAST'S DATA, THE WAY WAS OPEN FOR A FREEZE.

2. THIS PRESENTATION PROVIDES A USEFUL SUMMARY OF THE FORMAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH SECRETARY VANCE'S PENDING MOSCOW TRIP, AND MAY ALSO PROVIDE A PREVIEW OF SOVIET OPENING REMARKS ON MBFR ON THAT OCCASION. WE ARE THEREFORE REPORTING THE TEXT IN FULL. END SUMMARY

3. BEGIN TEXT OF INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION.

MR CHAIRMAN,

1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MANY COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE IN THEIR STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSIONS DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH OF THIS YEAR EXPRESSED THEIR LEGITIMATE CONCERN AT THE ABSENCE OF TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN OUR WORK. THIS FACT ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNS THE SOVIET DELEGATION INASMUCH AS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD HAVE AN ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE FOR THE STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL DETENTE AND FOR ITS COMPLEMENTING BY DETENTE IN THE MILITARY SPHERE WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE ALWAYS WORKING TOWARDS.

2. IN HIS FAMOUS JANUARY SPEECH IN TULA THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, L I BREZHNEV, STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO DISCUSSING QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO THIS SUBJECT AT ANY LEVEL AND IN ANY PLACE: IN BONN, IN
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WASHINGTON, IN MOSCOW, IN VIENNA OR WHEREVER".

3. THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS GUIDED BY THE PEACE-LOVING PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS STRIVING TO FACILITATE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. WE CAN IN ALL SERIOUSNESS SAY THAT THE SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS NOT FROM THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER PARTICIPANT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

4. AS WE HAVE ALREADY STATED MANY TIMES ONE HAS TO LOOK FOR THE REASON FOR THE ARTIFICIAL AND UNJUSTIFIABLE DRAGGING OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNREALISTIC POSITION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, WHICH FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF OUR JOINT WORK IN VIENNA, HAVE PUT FORWARD CONDITIONS OF REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE UNJUST TOWARDS THE SOCIALIST STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY ALSO UNACCEPTABLE.

5. ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN SCHEME IT IS INSISTENTLY PROPOSED

THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF TIMES AS MANY OF THEIR OWN FORCES AS THE WESTERN STATES THEMSELVES ARE READY TO REDUCE. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS INSIST THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTIONS AREA A WHOLE MAJOR FORMATION WHILE THE USA WOULD MAKE SELECTIVE REDUCTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN FROM VARIOUS UNITS AND SUB-UNITS ACCORDING TO ITS OWN DISCRETION. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA REFUSE COMPLETELY TO GIVE ANY GUARANTEE WHATSOEVER CONCERNING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES EVEN THOUGH THEIR ACTUAL REDUCTION WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA. ALL THE WESTERN

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PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE USA AND UNITED IN REJECTING ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS. AS FOR THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAS EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE A KNOWN PART OF ITS NUCLEAR POTENTIAL, THEY HAVE TIED THIS OFFER TO THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE ENTIRE SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WHICH IT IS WELL KNOWN IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS STEADFASTLY REJECT REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES.

6. IT IS PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD AGREE TO THE WESTERN CONCEPTION OF ESTABLISHING IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA SO-CALLED "COMMON

COLLECTIVE CEILINGS" OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES WHICH WOULD OF COURSE PLACE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN UNEQUAL AND UNJUST SITUATION. FOR PARTICULAR STATES, FOR EXAMPLE THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS ENVISAGED THAT SO-CALLED "NATIONAL CEILINGS" SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHILE FOR OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FRG OR GREAT BRITAIN, NO NATIONAL LIMITATIONS WHATSOEVER WOULD BE

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ESTABLISHED. THIS SECOND CATEGORY OF COUNTRIES COULD, AS WE HAVE OFTEN POINTED OUT IN OUR STATEMENTS, NOT ONLY REDUCE BUT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, EVEN INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH TODAY. SUCH A PROPOSAL CLEARLY RUNS CONTRARY TO THE VERY OBJECTIVE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, THE REFUSAL BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THE GENERAL SCOPE OF THEIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR SO-CALLED "COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS" DEPRIVES PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWING THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION OF ANY PARTICULAR STATE IN THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND WHAT THAT STATE'S CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION IS TOWARDS MILITARY DETENTE.

7. THEREFORE ALL THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS TAKEN ONE BY ONE AND, THIS WHOLE SCHEME TAKEN TOGETHER, CANNOT BE A SERIOUS, BUSINESSLIKE BASIS FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. AND THIS IS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE AT THE BASIS OF THE WHOLE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LIES THE INCORRECT, ARTIFICIAL, UNFOUNDED AND UNPROVEN ASSERTION OF SIGNIFICANT "DISPARITIES" IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND PRINCIPAL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHICH ALLEGEDLY EXIST IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

8. THE REPS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING REFERRED TO THE UNFOUNDED NATURE OF ASSERTIONS CONCERNING "DISPARITIES". THEY MADE STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE INCORRECTNESS AND THE OVERESTIMATION BY THE WEST OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN THE REGION OF REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 13 DECEMBER 1973 IN PARTICULAR EMPHASISED THAT THE "CONCEPTION 'OF DISPARITIES' BROUGHT FORWARD BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WAS AN ARTIFICIAL, FAR-FETCHED CONCEPTION RESTING ON

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ARBITRARILY CHOSEN FIGURES".

9. ALREADY LONG BEFORE THE TABLING OF OUR OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IN FEBRUARY 1976, AT THE 25TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE WAS CHARACTERIZED SUBSTANTIALLY BY BALANCE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS EXCLUDES ANY AGREEMENT ON THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO GROUPINGS IN THIS REGION. THE FACT THAT AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES HAS COME ABOUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN THE STATEMENTS OF LEADING WESTERN STATESMEN. WE HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO A NUMBER OF THESE STATEMENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

10. TODAY, AFTER THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE TABLED ON 10 JUNE 1976 THEIR OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA VALID FOR 1 JANUARY 1976 AND AFTER THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, ON 16 DECEMBER LAST YEAR DID THE SAME WITH RESPECT TO THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN FORCES, IT IS EVEN MORE OBVIOUS THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITIES EXISTED NOR EXIST IN ACTUAL FACT. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL DATA OF THE TWO SIDES, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES COMES TO 805,000 MEN AND FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS 731,000 MEN. IF THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES PRESENT IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT (AND IT CANNOT BE DOUBTED THAT IT IS LEGITIMATE TO TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT), THEN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND OF THE SOCIALIST STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY APPROXIMATE EQUALITY.

11. THE SAME SORT OF APPROXIMATE EQUALITY EXISTS ALSO IN THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO GROUPINGS AND THIS IS PROVED BOTH BY THE OFFICIAL DATA
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PRESENTED BY THE TWO SIDES AND BY THE STATEMENTS
FROM WESTERN DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES THAT NO

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SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES EXIST IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE
AIR FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

12. FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE
CONSTANTLY INVITED OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO DEPART FROM THE
ARTIFICIAL AND FARFETCHED CONCEPTION OF "DISPARITIES" AND TO
SET OUT ON THE PATH OF A REAL SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
AGREEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN APPROXIMATE
EQUALITY ALREADY EXISTS IN ACTUAL FACT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE TWO SIDES. WE HAVE CONSTANTLY INDICATED THAT THEIR
STEADFAST DETERMINATION TO OBTAIN FOR THEMSELVES UNILATERAL
MILITARY ADVANTAGES THROUGH THEIR ASSERTIONS OF "DISPARITIES"
AND THEIR DEMANDS ON THIS "BASIS" FOR A CONSIDERABLY GREATER
REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AS OPPOSED
TO THE FORCES OF NATO DOES NOT ASSIST PROGRESS IN THE TALKS
AND CAN ONLY LEAD THEM TO A DEAD END.

13. THIS IS ALREADY THE ELEVENTH ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS AND
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BEFORE IT COMES TO AN END WE SHOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO REPEAT
OUR INVITATION TO THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO TURN AWAY FROM
THEIR FAR-FETCHED ASSERTIONS CONCERNING "DISPARITIES" AND THE
NEED FOR "ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS" AND, TOGETHER WITH US,
TO LOOK FOR REAL PATHS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT. SUCH PATHS CAN
BE FOUND IN THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WHICH
WOULD NOT ALTER THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS EMERGED
HISTORICALLY IN THE REGION, WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE ANYBODY

UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND WHICH WOULD PRESERVE
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL.

14. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS COULD MAKE
A CRITICAL RE-EXAMINATION OF THEIR POSITIONS WHICH FROM THE VERY
OUTSET HAVE RUN CONTRADICTORY THE REAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES
IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WELL AS TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE
PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

15. REALLY, FOR HOW LONG AND ON WHAT BASIS IS IT POSSIBLE TO
DEMAND REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, NUMBERING, ACCORDING
TO THE WESTERN ESTIMATE 68,000 MEN IN EXCHANGE FOR 29,000
AMERICAN MILITARY SERVICEMEN? IS THIS PROPOSAL REALISTIC?
OF COURSE NOT. WHY THEN INSIST UPON IT AND BRAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS?

16. BY WHAT RIGHT IS IT POSSIBLE TO INSIST UPON COMPLETELY
DIFFERENT METHODS OF REDUCTION FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES,
OBTAINING THE REDUCTION OF THE FIRST BY MEANS OF THE WITHDRAWAL
OF AN ENTIRE MAJOR MILITARY FORMATION, AND FOR THE SECOND CHOOSING
A SELECTIVE MEANS? IS THIS DEMAND REALISTIC? ALSO NOT. BUT
STILL THE WEST ADVANCES IT.

17. WHY DO SIX OF THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHO HAVE
ENTERED VOLUNTARILY INTO NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE MUTUAL
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES STILL REFUSE A CLEAR
AND PRECISE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, WHAT QUANTITY OF THEIR
FORCES DO THEY INTEND TO REDUCE, AND WHEN, AFTER THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES?
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CERTAINLY IT IS WELL KNOWN TO THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WEST
EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA THAT, WITHOUT AN ANSWER TO THESE
QUESTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BEGIN THE REDUCTION OF ITS
FORCES. WHAT, ONE ASKS, PREVENTS THEM IN THE COURSE OF MORE THAN
THREE YEARS FROM INDICATING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF REDUCTION?
THERE ARE NO SUCH REAL OBSTACLES, OTHER THAN THE DESIRE TO
AVOID REDUCTION OR, AT A MINIMUM, TO DELAY THE NEGOTIATIONS.

18. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
ARE CONFRONTED BY THE PERMANENT REFUSAL OF THE WEST TO CARRY
OUT A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AND THOSE COMPONENTS OF
NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WHICH ARE POSSESSED BY ALMOST ALL WESTERN
STATES. IN OUR VIEW, THIS IS NOT A VERY LOGICAL POSITION, BUT
WE UNDERSTAND THAT NO KIND OF LOGIC WILL SUFFICE TO CAUSE THE
NATO STATES TO REDUCE IF THEY DO NOT WANT TO THESE KINDS OF
FORCES WHICH ARE MOST IMPORTANT FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.
WE, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO THINK THAT WITHOUT THE REDUCTION OF AIR
FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONE CANNOT EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVE
MILITARY RELAXATION IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE. THIS IS AN
ADDITIONAL REASON WHY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, VITALLY

INTERESTED IN THE DIMINUTION OF THE MILITARY DANGER, CONSIDER
AS HIGHLY TOPICAL THEIR PROPOSALS OF 19 FEBRUARY 1976 ENVISAGING,
IN PARTICULAR, REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES OF AIR FORCES AS WELL
AS OF THE NUCLEAR POTENTIALS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS.

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19. OUR WESTERN PARTNERS REFUSE ALSO A BROAD REDUCTION OF OTHER
FORMS OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, JUSTIFYING THEIR REFUSAL
ON THE GROUNDS THAT A REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS WOULD ON THE ONE
HAND GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND
WOULD ON THE OTHER HAND NOT BE FEASIBLE FROM THE PRACTICAL
POINT OF VIEW. THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF LUXEMBOURG
SPOKE ABOUT THIS IN PARTICULAR AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING.

20. IT IS COMPLETELY OBVIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT THESE OBJECTIONS
ARE AIMED ONLY AT CONCEALING THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN
COUNTRIES TO PROCEED TO A REALLY EFFECTIVE REDUCTION OF MILITARY
POTENTIALS. THE REDUCTION AS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT TOGETHER WITH THE REDUCED
FORCES TO WHICH THEY BELONG, ON THE BASIS OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE
REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES, WOULD NOT BE TO ANYONE'S UNILATERAL
DISADVANTAGE AND WOULD NOT CREATE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES OF A
PRACTICAL NATURE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. AN EVEN MORE SIMPLE
AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD METHOD WAS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST

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COUNTRIES ON 19 FEB 1976 FOR THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMAMENTS IN THE FIRST STAGE. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A LIMITED "MIXED PACKAGE" WHICH NOT ONLY PROPOSES THE "EXCHANGE" OF 1,700 SOVIET COMBAT TANKS FOR 1,000 OBSOLETE NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH THE USA ITSELF DECIDED SOME TIME AGO TO WITHDRAW FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AS SUPERFLUOUS, BUT ALSO ESTABLISHES A CONDITION THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE ENTIRE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME.

MR CHAIRMAN,

21. THE SOLUTION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE CARDINAL PROBLEMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT LINKED TO THE DISCUSSION OF FIGURES. WE STATED THIS EARLIER AND WE STATE IT AGAIN NOW THAT THE SIDES HAVE EXCHANGED NUMERICAL DATA. THEREFORE, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD LIKE OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES, WHILE ANALYZING THE NUMERICAL MATERIALS, NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE NECESSITY FOR A SERIOUS RE-EXAMINATION OF THEIR OVERALL APPROACHES TO REDUCTION, WHICH, AS WE HAVE SHOWN, STILL CONSTITUTE A FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLE TO THE SOLUTION OF OUR COMMON TASKS.

22. THE LAST SUBJECT ON WHICH WE SHOULD LIKE TO DWELL IS THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONCERNING A "FREEZE" OF THE MILITARY POTENTIALS OF THE SIDES FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS IS KNOWN, THIS QUESTION IS NOT NEW. NOW, HOWEVER, IT TAKES ON CERTAIN NEW AND IMPORTANT ASPECTS.

23. IN AS MUCH AS THERE ARE NOW ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OFFICIAL DATA PRESENTED BY THE SIDES CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION, AND A COMPARISON OF THESE DATA SHOWS THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY, THERE IS CREATED, ACCORDING TO OUR CONVICTION, AN EVEN MORE FAVORABLE SITUATION FOR PROCEEDING TO AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING A MUTUAL "FREEZE". IN THE PAST THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS JUSTIFIED THEIR REFUSAL TO PROCEED TO A MUTUAL "FREEZE" IN PARTICULAR ON

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THE GROUNDS THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES HAD NOT DESIGNATED THE EXACT NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION AND THEREFORE IT WAS NOT KNOWN CONCRETELY WHAT THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THESE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION WOULD BE AFTER THE ACHIEVING OF AN AGREEMENT. NOW THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DECLARED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH

OF THEIR FORCES, THIS ARGUMENT AGAINST A "FREEZE" FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE HAVE CRITICIZED IN THE PAST, BECOMES SIMPLY GROUNDLESS. AT THE PRESENT TIME, WHEN THE OFFICIAL FIGURES FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN DECLARED, AND THESE FIGURES SHOW THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL "DISPARITY", ANOTHER OBJECTION OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS AGAINST THE "FREEZE" WHICH WAS THAT SUCH A "FREEZE" ALLEGEDLY WOULD "REINFORCE" SIGNIFICANT "DISPARITIES" IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SIDES IN FAVOUR OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, ALSO FALLS AWAY.

24. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING A "FREEZE" FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IN ITSELF BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR MILITARY RELAXATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD MAKE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. RESOR

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SAS ID: 3080989
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
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TAGS: PARM, NATO
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